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COMMENTS
modify caveat emptor-that we give more protection to the purchaser. It
has been the purpose of this comment to show that his modification has
begun-Old maxims never die, they just fade away.
SALE BY DESCRIPTION-THE WARRANTY
OF MERCHANTABILITY
Under the Uniform Sales Act, as adopted by Illinois and 32 other states,
a sale of goods "by description" has the special legal consequence of im-
posing upon the seller a "warranty of merchantability":
Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods
of that description (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there
is an implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable quality.'
Identification of sales by description which would give rise to this war-
ranty is important. The Uniform Sales Act does not define the term, and,
therefore, cases must provide the definition.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Gardiner v. Gray2 is a very early case involving a warranty of mer-
chantability. Two dealers in silk contracted to buy and sell "waste silk."
The subject matter of the sale was in transit to England, and not subject to
the buyer's inspection. The waste silk when it arrived was not resaleable
as such and the court found that the seller impliedly warranted that it
would be so. In the later case of Jones v. Just,s Manila hemp was the sub-
ject of a similar sale. This hemp was, at the time of sale, on board ship
many miles from buyer and seller. Upon arrival, the hemp was found to
have been partially ruined by sea water, and therefore not resalable as
Manila hemp. The court held that the seller by describing the hemp as
Manila hemp impliedly agreed to sell Manila hemp fit for resale. Again the
parties were dealers in the type of goods bought and sold, and not grow-
ers or manufacturers.
As the warranty arose, in England it was implied between dealers who
intended to resell the goods. Thus specific goods,4 not subject to the
scrutiny of the parties, could apparently be the subject of a sale by descrip-
tion. In both the Gardiner and Jones cases the goods were specific in that
they were identified and agreed upon but not subject to inspection. The
seller offered a certain type of goods to the buyer who wished to resell
1 Uniform Sales Act S 15(2).
24 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (1815).
3 [1868] 3 Q.B. 197 (L.R.).
4 Those goods "identified and agreed upon at time a contract to sell or sale is
made." Uniform Sales Act § 76(1).
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and the court implied a warranty that the goods be of merchantable
quality which was equated with resalable quality.5 However, in America,
the common law rule was that the warranty of merchantable quality was
limited to sales by a manufacturer or grower.6
At the same time a warranty of fitness for particular purpose had arisen
which was more often applied and which required reliance by the buyer
as well as the disclosure of his particular purpose in buying the goods.7
There were apparently no limitations on who might be parties to the sale,
and the warranty was one of fitness for the buyer's particular purpose.
Such a warranty was found in sales by butchers of diseased meat.8 Oppor-
tunity for the seller to inspect was part of the reason for implying this
warranty. The warranty in he Gardiner and Jones cases actually partakes
somewhat of the nature of an implied warranty of fitness. The purpose of
the buyer, resale, was made known to the seller, and the buyer might be
said to have relied on the seller to furnish resalable goods. However, the
warranty which was implied by the court was one of quality rather than
fitness for purpose. However that may be, the two warranties were distin-
guished. This paper will not consider the warranty of fitness except as it
relates to the warranty of merchantability.
EARLY ILLINOIS DECISIONS
The position of the Illinois court before the Sales Act was in accord
with the common law view and is well illustrated in the case of Fuchs &
Long Mfg. Co. v. Kittredge & Co.9 Therein, the plaintiff sold a bronzing
machine, which it manufactured, to defendants. Various oral negotiations
took place, and finally a letter referring to a "No. 10 latest model bronz-
ing machine" was sent and the machine sold according to that description.
Defendant refused to pay, alleging that the machine was unfit for his pur-
poses. Plaintiff alleged, and was upheld by the court, that the sale was one
under a trade name, which precluded a warranty of fitness. The issue of
merchantability was submitted to the jury who decided against the de-
r De Stefano v. Associated Fruit Co., 318 Ill. 345, 149 N.E. 284 (1925); Raymond
Syndicate Inc. v. American Radio & Research Corp., 263 Mass. 147, 160 N.E. 821
(1928); Parker v. S. G. Shaghalian & Co., 244 Mass. 19, 138 N.E. 236 (1923).
GRyan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 392, 175 N.E. 105, 106
(1931).
7 This has been incorporated in the Uniform Sales Act § 15 (1): "Where the
buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose
for which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's
skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is as
[an] implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose."
8 Wiedeman v. Keller, 171 111. 93, 49 N.E. 210 (1898); Farrell v. Manhattan Market
Co., 198 Mass. 271, 84 N.E. 481 (1908); Rinaldi v. Mohican Co., 225 N.Y. 70, 121
N.E. 471 (1918).
9 242 111. 88, 89 N.E. 723 (1909).
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fendant. Thus it may be concluded then that in Illinois in 1909 a sale
under a trade name precluded a warranty of fitness, but not of merchanta-
bility, and that a sale by trade name was a sale by description, at least
when the goods were not present and identified. The court stated:
Where a known, described and definite article is ordered of a manufacturer,
.. [stated to be for a particular purpose by the buyer] there is no warranty
that it shall answer the particular purpose intended by the buyer .... If the
buyer gets what he bargained for, there is no implied warranty, though it does
not answer his purpose.10
This statement applied to implied warranties of fitness as the warranty
of merchantability was submitted to the jury, seemingly, with the ap-
proval of the Supreme Court and it would also appear, that merchantabil-
ity meant more than resalability, since defendant planned to use the ma-
chine, not resell it.
The Fuchs case involved the liability of a manufacturer under the war-
ranties of merchantability and fitness. The Sales Act, however, extends
this liability in Illinois to the ". . . seller . . . (whether he be the grower or
manufacturer or not)." The Santa Rosa-Vallejo Tan. Co. v. C. Kronauer
& Co." was then decided under the Sales Act. Defendant had contracted
to buy leather from plaintiff by trade name-"Butt-branded"-which in
the trade denoted a particular type and grade of leather. The leather was
not serviceable and the buyer refused to pay for it. The court precluded
a warranty of fitness because it was a sale under trade name, and quoted
Professor Williston 12 to the effect that in sales by description there is an
implied warranty of merchantability. But, the court stated:
This statement, however, we think, refers to subsection 2 of section 15,
which lays down the law applicable where goods are bought by description.
The section clearly distinguishes between such a sale and the sale of a specified
article under its patent or trade name.13
It would appear that section 15 (4) 14 of the Uniform Sales Act was held
to preclude warranties of fitness and quality. This appears to be contra to
the law as stated in the Fuchs case and the Sales Act. The further result
would be that a sale by description is not possible under a patent or trade
name.
At about the same time, a case arose where it appeared that plaintiff
housewife called up defendant storekeeper and asked for stove polish.15
10 Ibid., at 97, 726. 11228 Il1. App. 236 (1923).
12 Williston on Sales, 311 (1909).
13 Santa Rosa-Vallejo Tan. Co. v. C. Kronauer & Co., 228 Ill. App. 236, 246 (1923).
14 "In the case of a contract to sell or a sale of a specified article under its patent
or other trade name, there is no implied warranty as to its fitness for any particular
purpose." Uniform Sales Act S 15(4).
15 Neigenfind v. Singer, 227 Ill. App. 493 (1923).
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She claimed she asked for stove polish and he claimed she asked for Bull
Dog brand, and that he had recommended and sent Electric Shine. The
polish caught fire and injured the woman. It was found that there was
a sale under a trade name which precluded recovery on a warranty of
fitness. Plaintiff did not allege that the polish was not of the same quality
as other polish of the same brand so as to show unmerchantable quality,
nor was there any mention of sale by description. Yet it would appear
that this was a sale by description and plaintiff might have recovered on
breach of implied warranty of merchantability.
EXTENSION BY DECISIONS
In West Virginia, a jurisdiction where the Sales Act had not been
adopted, and presumably the common law was in force, a similar case
arose.16 There the plaintiff ordered an "Isko refrigerating unit No. 20."
He had seen similar machines, but he bought this one solely on the buyer's
description. The machine did not work, not even after repair. This was
held to be a sale under a trade name, and therefore no warranty of fitness
was implied. However, it was held that this was a sale by description giv-
ing rise to a warranty of merchantability. The buyer showed that this
machine was defective, not repairable, and therefore not merchantable.
The landmark case of Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc.17 de-
cided by Justice Cardozo extended the idea of sale by description still
further. Ryan's wife had gone to defendant's store and requested a loaf
of "Ward's bread." A clerk selected a loaf, handed it to her, and she paid
for it. A pin contained in the loaf injured the plaintiff. This was distinct-
ly a sale under a trade name precluding a warranty of fitness. However,
the court decided that a sale by trade name was a sale by description, and
that a warranty of merchantability attached. It was admitted that at com-
mon law such a warranty was limited to buyers who bought from manu-
facturers or growers, but the court pointed out that under the Sales Act
no such distinction was made. Thus, the warranty was also extended to
the ultimate consumer, and not merely to a dealer who bought for resale.
Prior to the Ryan case, a breach of an implied warranty of fitness had
been found when a buyer requested a can of beans, and the grocer had
supplied it.8 Sale under a trade name had been avoided.
The customer at a retail store is ordinarily bound to rely upon the skill and
experience of the seller in determining the kind of canned goods which he
will purchase, unless he demands goods of a definite brand or trade name. 19
16 Appalachian Power Co. v. Tate, 90 W. Va. 428, Ill. S.E. 150 (1922).
17255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
18 Ward v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 120 N.E. 225 (1918);
Chapman v. Roggenkamp, 182 Ill. App. 117 (1913).
19 Ward v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 91, 120 N.E. 225, 226
(1918).
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Thus, whether the container was sealed or not, or whether the goods were
in the original package or not, the warranty could be implied even though
the seller could not inspect the article. A similar case arose in Connecticut
where a woman entered a store and asked for a can of "corned beef." 20
The requirements for a warranty of fitness were found and recovery
allowed for a death caused by a piece of metal contained in the beef. The
facts, as compared to the Ryan case, were very similar, but resulted in dif-
ferent warranties.
THE TORPEY CASE-FACT SITUATIONS
The recent case of Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.21 denied recovery
to a guest in the purchaser's home who was injured when a jar, containing
applesauce purchased from defendant, collapsed in her hands. The basis of
the denial was no privity of contract, but the court made some interesting
statements by way of dicta. The woman who actually purchased the
applesauce went into the self-service store and selected, without help or
hindrance by any clerks, the particular jar of applesauce which she de-
sired. The court said: "These facts and circumstances cannot be construed
to be a purchase by description." 22 Therefore, it would seem that no im-
plied warranty could attach to a sale in a self-service store, unless a clerk's
advice or help was sought.
However, two and a half months after the Sales Act became law in
Illinois, a case was decided wherein the purchaser entered defendant's
store, picked up a can of herring labeled "Nord Star" from a display coun-
ter, paid for it, and took it home.23 The fish made the purchaser very ill.
Recovery was allowed on the basis of public policy, and an implied war-
ranty of fitness. No mention was made of the Sales Act.
In Texas, where the Uniform Sales Act has not been adopted, a woman
walked into a self-service store and selected, without assistance, a can of
"Iona Brand Corn" from the shelf.2 4 She and her family became violently
ill as a result of contaminated corn. The court wondered who the pur-
chaser could sue if not the retailer since there was no privity of contract
with the manufacturer. To give force to its Pure Food Acts, the purchaser
was allowed to recover for the breach of an implied warranty, but no
mention was made of what type of implied warranty.
In D'Onofrio v. First National Stores,25 a Rhode Island court, presented
with an almost identical fact situation as was present in the Torpey case,
20 Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 At]. 385 (1932).
21228 F.2d 117 (C.A. 8th, 1955).
22 Ibid., at 121.
23 Sloan v. F. W. Woolworth, 193 Ill. App. 620 (1915).
2 4 Walker v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 131 Tex. 57, 112 S.W.2d 170 (1938).
25 68 R.I. 144, 26 A.2d 758 (1942).
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relied on the Ryan case and Botti v. Venice Grocery Co. 26 A woman
selected a can of corn from a shelf in a self-service grocery store. The
corn was contaminated and caused the plaintiff to become ill. Recovery
was allowed on the basis of an implied warranty of merchantability. The
sale here was not by description in that the plaintiff selected the can from
the shelf without defendant's assistance as in the Torpey case. In both the
Ryan and Botti cases, the clerk selected the particular goods desired ac-
cording to the plaintiff's description. Although this distinguishing factor
would seem to negative a warranty of merchantability, the court appar-
ently saw fit to ignore the distinction. In an Ohio case, the plaintiff bought
a cigar at a drugstore which exploded because of a firecracker in it.27 The
sale was held to be under a trade name, so, the plaintiff was allowed re-
cover for breach of implied warranty of merchantability. The actual cir-
cumstances of the case were not clear. If the plaintiff had asked for and
received three El Ropo cigars, there would be a sale by description and
the holding would be in accord with the Ryan case. However, if the
plaintiff asked for El Ropo cigars and the box containing the store's sup-
ply of those cigars was presented so that he might select the cigars, the
fact situation might be altered sufficiently so that the sale might not be
by description, but by the buyer's own selection, thus precluding such a
warranty.
In Bovnan v. Woodway Stores, Inc. 28 the Illinois court considered a
situation similar to that in the Ryan case. A father came into a grocery
store and asked for canned milk by trade name. The milk apparently was
taken from a shelf by a clerk and given to him and later given to his child
who died shortly thereafter. The court held that there was a warranty offitness because subsection 4 of section 15 of the Sales Act did not apply
to the sale of foodstuffs for immediate consumption. This was done to
give effect to the Pure Food and Drug Act.29 No mention was made of
warranties of merchantability or sales by description.
A more recent Illinois case involved the sale of mascara at a ten-cent
store.30 Plaintiff selected a tube of mascara without assistance from the
clerk, and then paid for it. The court held that no warranty of fitness
could be implied because of the sale under a trade name. There was some
26 309 Mass. 450, 35 N.E.2d 491 (1941). In this case plaintiff asked for and received
"La Rosa" macaroni from the clerk in a store. After eating this he became ill. The
trade name precluded an implied fitness warranty, but the sale was held to be by de-
scription and a warranty of merchantability was implied.
27Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman, 57 Ohio App. 190, 13 N.E.2d 130 (1936).
28258 I1. App. 307 (1930), rev'd on ground that evidence did not show that milk
was the cause of death, 345 111. 110, 177 N.E. 727 (1931).
29 IlI. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 56Y2, § 16.
so Beckett v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 376 Il1. 470, 34 N.E. 2d 427 (1941).
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discussion of possible express warranties made by the sales girl, but it was
found that none were given. This sale was not by description, but if the
woman had asked for a certain brand of mascara and the clerk had given
it to her, a warranty of merchantability might have been implied.
RECENT DECISIONS
The New York courts since the Ryan case seem to have had little
trouble finding a warranty of merchantability without discussion of sale
by description. Refrigerators, 1 smoking tobacco, 3 2 a television set,33 a
hammer,34 and a washing machine35 were all purchased apparently by
trade name. Judge Cardozo himself said, in the Ryan case, that "the rule
is different, to be sure, upon a sale of specific goods, not purchased by
description."3 6
In a recent Massachusett's case, plaintiff's agent went to defendant's
store and asked if there were any more metal coffee makers that had been
on sale.3 7 The clerk replied in the affirmative, pointed to some and asked
if that was what was meant. Plaintiff's agent said yes, purchased the coffee
maker, and returned it to plaintiff. The device blew up, injuring plaintiff.
The court held that this was probably a sale by description. The coffee
maker had a trade name but the sale was not found to be under a trade
name. It appeared that recovery was allowed for breach of implied war-
ranties of fitness and merchantable quality.
A New Jersey court allowed recovery on some warranty (it was not
quite clear which) in a fact situation in which the Torpey dictum indi-
cated that no warranty should be implied.38 Parents had come into a self-
service store and selected packaged rolls without help from the store-
keeper. A piece of wire in a roll injured the son. The parents were
allowed to recover medical expenses from the retailer who was allowed to
recover the same amount from the baker.
In Pennsylvania, a seller sued to recover the purchase price of a hoist
from the buyer who alleged that the hoist would not do the work re-
quired. 39 The seller's salesman had shown the buyer a catalogue containing
31 Kelvinator Sales Corp. v. Quabbin Improvement Co., 234 App. Div. 96, 254
N.Y.Supp. 123 (1st Dep't, 1931).
32 Foley v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 136 Misc. 468, 241 N.Y.Supp. 233 (S.Ct.,
1930), aff'd 232 App.Div. 822, 249 N.Y.Supp. 924 (2nd Dept., 1931).
33 Horowitz v. Bursens, 198 Misc. 399, 91 N.Y.S.2d 413 (S.Ct., 1949).
34 Aldock v. Wnuk, 198 Misc 474, 98 N.Y.S.2d 964 (S.Ct., 1950).
35 Marino v. Maytag Atlantic Co., 141 N.Y.S.2d 432 (Mun. Ct. N.Y., 1955).
36255 N.Y. 388, 394, 175 N.E. 105, 107 (1931).
37 McCabe v. L. K. Liggett Drug Co., 330 Mass. 177, 112 N.E.2d 254 (1953).
88 Duncan v. Juman, 25 N.J. Super. 330, 96 A.2d 415 (1953).
39 Frantz Equipment Co. v. Leo Butler Co., 370 Pa. 459, 88 A.2d 702 (1952).
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a picture of the hoist, and a description of it. When the hoist arrived it
was found defective and irreparable. The court, in allowing recovery,
stated:
Whether the sale here be regarded as one "under a trade name" or "by de-
scription" (in fact it was both) is wholly immaterial since a designation by
trade name is itself a "description" which makes applicable clause second of
Section 15 of the Act. . . . It would be wholly unreasonable to hold that, if
one were to purchase, for example, an automobile under the trade name of
"Ford" or "Buick" or "Cadillac" or the like, no implied warranty of merchant-
able quality could be asserted by the purchaser even though the particular
car delivered was in such bad condition . . . [that it] was wholly useless for
the ordinary purpose which an automobile is designed to serve.40
This discussion does not seem to indicate much concern for whether the
sale was by description or not. A short time later another Pennsylvania
court found a warranty of merchantability in the sale of a new car.41 The
buyer was shown a similar car and allowed to drive it. He selected the
particular color and model of his own car, which was then ordered. This
was clearly a sale by description, since the car in question was identified
only by the seller's words. Eight days after the car was delivered, the
steering mechanism failed, causing a crash. The seller offered to repair the
car, but the buyer demanded a new one or the return of the purchase
price. The seller's implied warranty of merchantability was held to be
broken and the buyer recovered, though the sale was held to be under
a trade name which excluded a fitness warranty.
EFFECTS OF INSPECTION
In Tennessee, a buyer purchased a new car from a dealer under a trade
name.42 A leaky roof and doors injured the upholstery. The dealer claimed
to have fixed the defect, but the buyer sued for adjustment of the pur-
chase price. An implied warranty of merchantability was found and while
the exact circumstances of the sale do not appear, the court had this to
say:
The term sale by description strictly means an executory sale where the arti-
cle is not present, but the term has been broadened to include all sales, whether
or not the goods are present, where there is no adequate opportunity for inspec-
tion.43
This view is not without support.44 In Wade v. Chariot Trailer Co.,45 a
purchaser of a trailer by trade name inspected it before buying. Within
40 Ibid., at 465 and 706.
41 Knapp v. Willys-Ardmore, Inc., 174 Pa. Super. 90, 100 A.2d 105 (1953).
42 Kohn v. Ball, 36 Tenn. App. 281, 254 S.W.2d. 755 (1953).
43 Ibid., at 286 and 758.
44 In fact, it closely resembles the thought in the Gardiner and Jones cases noted
supra, notes 2 and 3.
45 331 Mich. 576, 50 N.W.2d 162 (1951).
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three months the trailer had deteriorated far more than it should have
under the normal use given it. The court held that the fact of a sale under
a trade name might exclude a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose,
"but its reasonable fitness for the general purpose for which it was manu-
facured and sold is not excluded. ' 46 This could refer only to a warranty
of merchantability, and consequently to a sale by description. It would
appear, therefore, that if the defect were latent, this warranty would at-
tach even though an inspection of the goods were made.
A prior holding in the same court is not altogether in accord. 47 There,
Maldover agreed to sell aluminum sheeting to Salzman in a lot of approxi-
mately 790,000 pounds. The sheeting was surplus metal, and some had
been made into other shapes. The contract recited that the metal had been
inspected. The court held that there could be no implied warranty of
merchantability because:
* . . the transaction was not a sale of goods by description, but was a sale of
specifically designated aluminum sheets. Having expressly stated in the con-
tract that they had examined these sheets, plaintiffs may not now assert an im-
plied warranty of quality or fitness.4 8
The fact was that inspection was at best very difficult. Be that as it may,
the inspection precluded a sale by description, and thus no warranty of
merchantability arose. The later decision in the Wade case, which allowed
a warranty of merchantability although inspection was made, seems to be
a departure.
In Grass v. Steinberg49 an Illinois court ruled on a similar situation.
Steinberg, a dealer in machinery, sold a turret lathe to Grass who, previous
to the sale, had the machine thoroughly inspected by machinists of wide
experience. The contract described the machine as a "Warner Swasey
Turret Lathe . . . as is." Apparently the machine was a hodge-podge of
parts, not like anything which Warner & Swasey had made. The court
held that:
•. if this was not a sale by description, no implied warranty, such as plain-
tiff relies upon, ever existed. In view of the inspection and examination of the
machine by plaintiff and his experts on numerous occasions before the pur-
chase, we think this transaction cannot be considered as a sale by description
... [this was not the sale of a] machine standardized only by description.50
The court goes on to say that an implied warranty of merchantability
arises only in ". . . cases where the specific article bought was either not
in existence or not on hand at the time and place of the sale." 51 It would
46 Ibid., at 581 and 165.
47 Salzman v. Maldaver, 315 Mich. 403, 24 N.W.2d 161 (1946).
48 Ibid., at 410 and 166.
49 331 111. App. 378, 73 N.E.2d 331 (1947).
50 Ibid., at 383 and 334. 51 Ibid., at 384 and 334.
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seem, therefore, by inference that the court would not extend the mean-
ing of sale by description even as far as the Ryan case, and would perhaps
hold that a description such as "Ward's Bread" was simply an identifica-
tion of the loaf desired. In an earlier Illinois case, opportunity to inspect
a lot of furniture precluded a warranty of merchantability.52 A few
articles were inspected, but the bulk was not. Though the seller manufac-
turer knew that the buyer intended to resell the goods, no warranty was
implied.
Another early case in Illinois precluded a warranty in the sale of hay
because of inspection by the buyer. 3 The defect was not obvious. A
recent decision in Washington, by contrast, allowed recovery although
the buyer, who was an experienced hay buyer, examined and selected the
bales of hay that he bought1 4 Recovery was allowed under a warranty of
merchantability and fitness arising under sections 15 (1) and 15 (2) of the
Sales Act. It would seem that the fitness warranty should have been de-
feated on the ground of non-reliance, and the quality warranty on the
basis that there was a sale of specific goods and inspection by the buyers.
RELATED PROBLEMS
Occasionally, goods are misdescribed and a warranty under section 14 of
the Uniform Sales Act could be found.55 For example, a farmer came into
a store which sold seed and asked for "good field corn, the kind you
husk." He was given seed which turned out to be ensilage corn seed.
Recovery, however, was allowed on a breach of warranty of merchant-
ability.56 Although it would appear that the sale was by description and
that goods which did not conform were furnished the possibility of
recovery under Section 14 was not discussed.
There are occasions when goods are sold by description or under a
trade name and are not suited to the buyer or his purpose. Recovery can-
not be had under a warranty of merchantability if the goods are perfectly
all right as such.57 However, in such sales a warranty of fitness may be
found because of a buyer's special reliance on the seller.58
52 People v. Western Picture Frame Co., 368 Ill. 336, 13 N.E.2d 958 (1938).
5 3 Becker v. Brawner, 18 I11. App. 39 (1885).
5 4 Libke v. Craig, 35 Wash. 2d 870, 216 P.2d 189 (1950).
55 "Where there is a contract to sell or a sale of goods by description, there is an
implied warranty that the goods shall correspond with the description and if the con-
tract or sale be by sample as well as by description, it is not sufficient that the bulk of
the goods corresponds with the sample if the goods do not also correspond with the
description." Uniform Sales Act § 14.
56 Sokoloski v. Splann, 311 Mass. 203, 40 N.E.2d 874 (1942).
57 Dunbar Bros. Co. v. Consolidated Iron-Steel Mfg. Co., 23 F.2d 416 (C.C.A. 2d,
1928); Outhwaite v. A. B. Knowlson Co., 259 Mich. 224, 242 N.W. 895 (1932); Green
Mountain Mushroom Co. v. Brown, 117 Vt. 509, 95 A.2d 679 (1953).
58 Ralston Purina Co. v. Novak, II1 F.2d. 631 (C.A.Sth, 1940); Giant Mfg. Co. v.
Yates-American Mach. Co., 111 F.2d 360 (C.A.8th, 1940); Davenport Ladder Co. v.
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DESCRIPTION AS EXTENDING TO CONTAINER
In Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. it was further stated:
The merchandise was primarily food and it is doubtful whether in any event
an implied warranty would include the glass jar which, of course, was not in-
tended for consumption. 9
Thus, it would seem that an implied warranty of merchantability would
not extend to a container, even if there were a sale by description. In
Crandall v. Stop & Shop, Inc.,60 a woman was injured by a spring clamp
holding the lid on a jar of fruit preserves. Recovery was denied because
no negligence by the defendant was discovered, and because an implied
warranty of fitness did not extend to the container. The court relied upon
a defective pop bottle explosion case decided in a lower California court
which denied recovery and which was reported in the Chicago Daily
Law Bulletin of the time. Also cited in the Torpey case was Poplar v.
Hockschild, Kohn & Co.61 wherein a box containing beauty aids was sold
to plaintiff. An injury was caused by a large metal star with sharp points
which was mounted on top of the box. Recovery was denied, but the dan-
ger of injury was obvious rather than latent. The sale was over a counter
and perhaps not by description.
Since these cases, other decisions have extended an implied warranty to
the container as well as the contents. Store owners who purchased carbo-
nated beverages by description from dealers were injured by bottle ex-
plosions, and the implied warranty of merchantability was extended so as
to include the container as well as the beverage itself.6 2 Other courts have
imposed what amounted to absolute liability on the store keeper in allow-
ing recovery for carbonated beverage bottle explosions.0 2 When bottles
exploded upon removal from a shelf in a self-service store, causing injury,
two courts refused recovery on any warranty because there was no con-
tract, but not necessarily because the implied warranty could not extend to
the container.64
In a recent Massachusetts case, recovery was allowed when the plaintiff
was injured by a pop bottle explosion which occurred as plaintiff opened
Edward Hines Lumber Co., 43 F.2d 63 (C.A.8th, 1930); Halterman v. Louisville
Bridge and Iron Co., 254 S.W.2d 493 (Ct.App.Ky., 1953).
59 228 F.2d 117, 120 (C.A.8th, 1955).
60 288 Ill. App. 543, 6 N.E.2d 685 (1937).
61 180 Md. 389, 24 A.2d 783 (1942).
62 Poulous v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Boston, 322 Mass. 386, 77 N.E.2d 405
(1948); Naumann v. Wehle Brewing Co., 127 Conn. 44, 15 A.2d 181 (1940).
63Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953); Mahoney v. Shaker Square
Beverages, Inc., 102 N.E.2d 281 (Ohio Com. PI., 1951).
64 Lasky v. Economy Grocery Stores, 319 Mass. 224, 65 N.E.2d 305 (1946); Loch v.
Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949).
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the bottle.65 The beverage was purchased from an automatic vending ma-
chine. The court held that this was a sale by description under a trade
name, which precluded an implied fitness warranty. However, an implied
warranty of merchantability was found. It would seem, therefore, that
there is a trend toward extending a warranty of merchantability to the
container of goods, particularly in those cases where the defect is latent,
and potentially dangerous to person. In Ouzts v. Maloney 6 two dealers
contracted to buy and sell pie mix. The sale was by sample. Plaintiff was
shown the carton and he approved it. Subsequently, it was discovered that
the package violated government regulations. The defendant was held not
liable on an implied warranty of merchantability because each party to
the sale had equal opportunity to discover the defect, but not because
such a warranty could not extend to the package. Here the defect was
not latent, nor could it be said to be very dangerous to person.
ENGLISH DECISIONS
In the realm of implied warranties of merchantability, the English
courts have been quite liberal. In Wren v. Holt67 it was stated that ordi-
narily sales over the counter could not be sales by description so as to
give rise to an implied warranty of merchantability. Later, it was stated:
The implied condition that the goods are of merchantable quality applies
to all goods bought from a seller who deals in goods of that description,
whether they are sold under a patent or trade name or otherwise .... The
phrase "merchantable quality" seems more appropriate to a retail purchase
buying from a wholesale firm than to private buyers, and to natural products,
such as grain, wool, or flour, than to a complicated machine, but it is clear
that it extends to both .... 68
On the meaning of sale by description it was said:
There is a sale by description even though the buyer is buying something
displayed before him on the counter: a thing is sold by description, though it
is specific, so long as it is sold not merely as the specific thing but as a thing
corresponding to a description, e.g., woolen under-garments .... 60
The sale that gave rise to this statement was a sale of woolen undergar-
ments over a counter in a clothing store. The injury complained of was
dermatitis caused by free sulphites in the garment. The court stated the
prevailing view of implied warranties of fitness and quality: ". . . [these]
two implied conditions by which it has been said the old rule [of caveat
emptor] has been changed to the rule of caveat venditor....
65 Mead v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 329 Mass. 440, 108 N.E.2d 757 (1952).
66 157 Ohio St. 537, 106 N.E.2d 561 (1952).
07 [1903] 1 K.B. 610.
68 Bristol Tramways, etc., Carriage Co. v. Fiat Motors, [1910] 2 K.B. 831, 840.
69 Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, Ltd., [1936] A.C. 85, 100.
70 Ibid., at 98.
In 1928, the English court extended a warranty of merchantability to
the container as well as to the conents. 71 The plaintiff went into de-
fendant's public-house and asked for a bottle of Stone's ginger wine. The
sale was held to be under a trade name precluding a fitness warranty. The
court had little difficulty in finding that the bottle sold to plaintiff was
not of merchantable quality, because the bottle broke injuring plaintiff
while he was engaged in opening it properly.
The English courts have been quite willing to extend the meaning of
sale by description, so as to include most all sales and all things purchased,
container or not, probably to a greater extent than most American courts.
By contrast, the Illinois courts, as indicated previously, have been loathe
to extend the pale of implied warranties. In a recent case, plaintiff ordered
printed programs and selected the kind of type to be used. Such selection
was held to prevent an implied warranty of fitness from arising.7 2 There
was no discussion of a warranty of merchantability under Sec. 15 (2)
though the sale was by description and it seemed possible that the pro-
grams were not of merchantable quality. In another case decided at the
same time, a bottling company escaped liability to the ultimate consumer
on the grounds that the bottle might have been tampered with.73 The
court spoke of warranty and applied tort law, not considering privity of
contract, reliance by the buyer or sale by description. Apparently in such
a case something similar to absolute liability may be applied if non-tam-
pering can be proved.
THE COMMERCIAL CODE
The Uniform Commercial Code became law in Pennsylvania on July 1,
1954, but this is the only jurisdiction which has adopted it to date. It pro-
vides as follows:
(1) Unless excluded or modified .... a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant
with respect to goods of that kind or though not a merchant states generally
that they are guaranteed. The serving for value of food and drink to be con-
sumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as (a) pass without ob-
jection in the trade under the contract description; and (b) are of fair aver-
age quality in the trade and within the description; and (c) are fit for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and .... 74
Exactly what changes in decisions this statute will bring about remain to
be seen. Sale under a trade name, however, no longer would preclude a
warranty of fitness for the buyer's purpose.75 It would seem that this pro-
71 Morelli v. Fitch and Gibbons, [1928] 2 K.B. 636.
72 Sampson v. Marra, 343 Ill. App. 245, 98 N.E.2d 523 (1951).
73 Williams v. Paducah Coca Cola Bottling Co., 343 Ill. App. 1, 98 N.E.2d 164 (1951).
74 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314.
75 Ibid. § 2-315, Comment 5 (Revised final draft, 1952).
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vision should cover many cases now being decided under section 15 (2) of
the Sales Act as sales by description under the implied warranty of
merchantability.
CONCLUSION
As has been noted, a sale by description has been understood to include
almost any sale, whether the goods were present or not. This is a most
liberal view. Other courts have ignored the problem that the phrase "by
description" should raise, or perhaps it has not been brought to their
attention. Still other courts have considered inspection by the buyer to be
the key to the problem, in spite of the contradiction between "by descrip-
tion" and "by inspection." Difficulty of thorough inspection, latent de-
fects, and the like have moved these courts to stretch the meaning of sale
by description so that a warranty might be found. In the sale of food-
stuffs which cause injury it would seem that almost any result is possible.
For example, in Illinois, where there is apparently a tendency toward
strictness in the interpretation of "by descripion," warranties in the sale of
carbonated beverages have been implied without a contract much less a
sale by description, in spite of the fact that the statute does not differen-
tiate between sales of foodstuffs or hard goods.
The whole problem is a technical one, the handling of which has varied
from fact situation to fact situation. This is due, perhaps, to conflicting
desires to extend, on the one hand, the utmost in protection to the con-
sumer public at large; and, on the other, to comply with the law as it is
written.
EFFECT ON A PERCENTAGE LEASE OF A TENANT'S
CONDUCTING THE SAME BUSINESS
ON OTHER PROPERTY
A percentage lease is one wherein the tenant is required to pay as
rental a specified percentage of the gross income from business conducted
upon the premises. To the ordinary covenants of a lease are added certain
clauses governing the manner in which business may be conducted, how
the percentage is estimated, and how it is to be paid to the landlord.'
Litigation in the percentage lease field most often centers around the
determination of gross income. The most common situation is the subject
matter of this note-the tenant, either innocently or willfully, deprives
the landlord of his expected return on the lease by transferring some or
all of the business to another location. The amount of business to which
the percentage clause is to attach is accordingly decreased, to the detri-
ment of the landlord and to the benefit of the tenant.
1 McMichael, Leases, p. 21 (4th ed., 1947).
